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INTRODUCTION 
Many international business transactions integrate an arbitration 
clause into the agreement as companies choose to keep potential disputes 
out of the court systems.1 Enforcement of the awards rendered pursuant to 
                                                   
* J.D. Pepperdine University School of Law 2019; Certificate in Dispute 
Resolution from the Straus Institute for Dispute Resolution. 
1 See generally Richard R. W. Brooks & Sarath Sanga, Commercial 
Arbitration Agreements Between Sophisticated Parties: An Empirical View, 
SEMANTIC SCHOLAR (2013), 
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such agreements is straightforward in the United States thanks to the 
Federal Arbitration Act, as long as the United States is the forum for the 
arbitration proceeding.2 Even if the forum is outside of U.S. jurisdiction, 
several treaties, namely the Panama Convention3 and the New York 
Convention,4 provide for recognition of a foreign arbitrated award by U.S. 
courts, as well as recognition by U.S. courts of any annulment or 
suspension judgments rendered by courts in the State where the arbitration 
proceeding took place.5  
                                                   
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/7b40/3f93d2fdc59aa8d7e1ea55da8ec0c787e00d
.pdf. International commercial agreements are more likely than their U.S. 
domestic counterparts to include an arbitration clause. Id. at 12–14. 
2 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). Agreements in writing to arbitrate current or 
future controversies “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” Id. 
3 The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial 
Arbitration, or "Panama Convention," went into effect in 1976. 14 I.L.M. 336 
(1975) [hereinafter Panama Convention]. It provided for “enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards in Latin America,” which had been previously governed by a less-
than ideal mélange of three separate treaties (to none of which the United States 
had been a party). John P. Bowman, The Panama Convention and its 
Implementation Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 11 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 1, 7–
8 (2000). The Panama Convention was intended to achieve the same results as the 
New York Convention and has been successful in this to a large extent. Id. at 21–
23. 
4 The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, or “New York Convention,” entered into force in 
1959. 21 UST 2517 [hereinafter New York Convention]. See also 9 U.S.C. § 201 
(2006) (the US Code section codifying the treaty). The New York Convention 
primarily concerns itself “with the arbitration agreement and award—the starting 
and ending points of the arbitral process—and not with the conduct of the 
proceedings, except as that conduct may impair the award.” See Bowman, supra 
note 3, at 24. For the purposes of this analysis, this difference is irrelevant, as the 
on-point sections of the conventions, the Panama Convention’s Article 5 and the 
New York Convention’s Article V are verbatim in relevant parts. When both 
Conventions apply and all parties to the arbitration are citizens of states that are 
signatories to the Panama Convention, the Panama Convention governs. Id. at 93–
94. 
5 Both conventions create a presumption of recognition. See Panama 
Convention, supra note 3, at art. 4 (“[a]n arbitral decision or award that is not 
appealable . . . shall have the force of a final judicial judgement”); see also New 
York Convention, supra note 4, at art. III (“[e]ach Contracting State shall 
recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them”); see also Bowman, supra 
note 3, at 83–84 (“a movant seeking to confirm an award falling under the Panama 
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However, two recent cases heard by the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit have shed light on the intricacies of 
enforcing foreign judgments, specifically when such judgments annul 
arbitrated awards that have already been recognized by U.S. courts.6 The 
first case being Pemex which presents an unusual situation where a U.S. 
court declined to nullify a foreign arbitral award, despite the courts of the 
foreign jurisdiction granting an annulment.7 The second case, Thai-Lao 
Lignite, sees the Second Circuit side with the foreign jurisdiction, and 
vacate a judgement based on an annulled foreign award.8 The two cases 
together provide a road map to this relatively narrow issue for parties who 
may seek recognition (or to avoid recognition) of a foreign arbitral award 
in the Second Circuit, or in other U.S. jurisdictions where the Second 
Circuit provides persuasive guidance. This article will summarize the 
Pemex and Thai-Lao Lignite cases and then synthesize their respective 
tests for whether an annulled foreign arbitral award should nonetheless be 
given effect in the United States. 
 
                                                   
Convention in a United States court should be confident that it has presented a 
prima facie case by submitting an authenticated original or copy of the arbitration 
agreement and arbitral award”); see, e.g., TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 
487 F.3d 928, 930 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding in a case involving an arbitral award 
annulled in the foreign jurisdiction that “because the arbitration award was 
lawfully nullified by the country in which the award was made, appellants have 
no cause of action in the United States to seek enforcement of the award under the 
FAA or the New York Convention”). However, both conventions also provide 
that jurisdictions where recognition and enforcement is sought may refuse to 
recognize and enforce the arbitrated award if doing so would be “contrary to the 
public policy” of that country. See Panama Convention, supra note 3, at art. 
5(2)(b); see also New York Convention, supra note 4, at art. V(2)(b). 
6 See Panama Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5(2)(b); see also New 
York Convention, supra note 4, at art. V(2)(b); see also Baker Marine, Ltd. v. 
Chevron, Ltd., 191 F.3d 194,197 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting the permissive “may” in 
“award may be refused,” but holding that the party seeking refusal of recognition 
of the foreign judgments in that case had “shown no adequate reason for refusing 
to recognize the judgements”). 
7 Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De C.V. 
v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. 
dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 1622, 197 L. Ed. 2d 746 (2017). 
8 Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 864 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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I. PEMEX 
A. Introduction  
The first words of Justice Jacobs’ opinion in the Pemex case are: 
“[t]he truly unusual procedural history of this case requires us to reconcile 
two settled principles that militate in favor of opposite results.”9 “Truly 
unusual” is a valid way to describe the result of Pemex, where the Second 
Circuit declined to enforce a judgment of a foreign court that annulled an 
arbitrated award.10 Instead, the Second Circuit gave effect to the original 
arbitral award for approximately $300 million, even after that award was 
given no effect in the original forum state, Mexico.11 
 
B. Factual background 
The Pemex case involved a contract dispute between two 
companies, Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. 
De C.V. (COMMISA) and Pemex-Exploración Y Producción (PEP).12 
COMMISA was a Mexican subsidiary of a United States construction and 
military contracting corporation, while PEP was a subsidiary of Petroleos 
Mexicanos, a petroleum company which acted on behalf of the Mexican 
government.13 PEP and its parent company were both technically public 
entities of the Mexican government, and Petroleos Mexicanos was 
essentially the Mexican state’s oil and gas company.14 
In 1997, COMMISA was contracted by PEP “to build oil 
platforms in the Gulf of Mexico,” with the contract including an arbitration 
clause that required contract disputes be arbitrated in Mexico City in 
accordance with International Chamber of Commerce arbitration 
regulations.15 Additionally, PEP was authorized under the contract to 
unilaterally exercise an “Administrative Recission” clause if COMMISA 
breached, and COMMISA was required to post performance bonds.16 In 
2003, after COMMISA and PEP disagreed over certain logistical, cost, 
                                                   
9 Pemex, 832 F.3d at 97. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 97–98. 
15 Id. at 98. 
16 Id. 
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and construction-related issues with the performance of the 1997 contract, 
the two parties executed a new contract with “virtually-identical 
arbitration and administrative rescission clauses” to the original contract.17  
 Despite the new contract, the parties were still unable to ensure a 
successful deal.18 In 2004, PEP alleged that COMMISA had failed to meet 
milestones set out in the contract.19 They ejected COMMISA from the job 
sites (where construction was 94 percent complete) and announced their 
intent “to administratively rescind the contracts.”20 COMMISA filed for 
arbitration seated in Mexico City and beginning in 2005, even though PEP 
had asserted that they were rescinding the contract.21 In a preliminary 
award in late 2006, the arbitration panel enjoined PEP from collecting the 
performance bonds COMMISA had posted until the final arbitral award 
was issued.22 After the preliminary award/injunction was made by the 
arbitral body, PEP raised its contention that under Mexican law the 
administrative rescission it was pursuing was not subject to arbitration.23 
As the arbitration proceeded, Mexican law changed in two notable 
ways.24 First, in late 2007, jurisdiction for claims like COMMISA’s was 
given exclusively to the Mexican Tax and Administrative court, and the 
applicable statute of limitations was reduced from ten years to forty-five 
days.25 Second, in mid-2009, Section 98 of the Law of Public Works and 
Related Services was enacted, which ended arbitration for administrative 
rescission claims like the ones COMMISA made against PEP.26 
PEP had contended after the preliminary arbitration award that 
administrative rescission was exempt from arbitration, since its use of 
administrative rescission stemmed directly from the Mexican 
government’s authority.27 However, the arbitration panel rejected this 
argument and awarded $300 million in damages to COMMISA in 
December 2009, finding that PEP had breached the contracts.28 
COMMISA took the award to be confirmed in the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York, which ruled in 
                                                   
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. at 98–99. 
23 Id. at 99. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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COMMISA’s favor in August 2010.29 PEP appealed that decision to the 
Second Circuit while simultaneously fighting the award in Mexico in the 
Eleventh Collegiate Court.30 With the Second Circuit appeal still pending, 
the Mexican court ordered the $300 million award annulled on the basis 
that the rescission was not arbitrable, due to the Mexican government’s 
being involved through PEP, referencing Section 98 several times.31  
The simultaneous action in the Second Circuit was remanded 
down to the Southern District of New York for consideration of the effect 
of the Mexican court’s decision.32 After hearing additional evidence on 
“applicable Mexican legal provisions,” the district court declined to annul 
the award, holding that doing so would “[violate] basic notions of justice 
in that it [would apply] a law that was not in existence at the time the 
parties' contract was formed and [would leave] COMMISA without an 
apparent ability to litigate its claims.”33 The district court specifically 
noted that Section 98 was applied retroactively “to favor a state 
enterprise,” and that COMMISA would be unable to seek any remedy for 
its claims since the claims would exceed the new, shortened statute of 
limitations.34 PEP then appealed the judgment back to the Second 
Circuit.35 
 
C. Holding  
The Second Circuit held that the court for the Southern District of 
New York did not exceed its authority nor abuse its discretion in declining 
to nullify the arbitrated award or to include in its judgment the $106 
million in performance bonds that PEP had collected.36 Giving effect to 
the Mexican nullification of the award would, from Circuit Judge Jacobs, 
“run counter to United States public policy and would (in the operative 
                                                   
29 Id. 
30 Id. The Eleventh Collegiate Court is analogous to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 100 (quoting the district court’s decision on the matter in 
Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex 
Exploración y Producción, 962 F.Supp.2d 642, 644 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 97. 
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phrasing) be ‘repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just’ 
in this country.”37  
 
D. Reasoning 
The Second Circuit based its holding on a narrow public policy 
exception within the Panama Convention, which overcame the “pro 
enforcement bias” of that agreement.38 To meet the exception, the court 
listed four influencing factors: “(1) the vindication of contractual 
undertakings and the waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of 
retroactive legislation that disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need 
to ensure legal claims find a forum; and (4) the prohibition against 
government expropriation without compensation.”39  
  
i. The Panama Convention  
Adopted in 1975, the Inter-American Convention on International 
Commercial Arbitration (the “Panama Convention”) is an agreement 
signed by nineteen American countries, including the United States and 
Mexico that directs courts to generally enforce arbitral awards rendered 
abroad.40 Within the text of the convention however, there are seven 
enumerated exceptions to enforcement of a foreign ruling; these include 
things like situations when a party could not present a defense at 
arbitration and situations when the arbitration was not carried out 
according to agreed-upon terms or in accordance with local laws.41 The 
final exception, latched onto by the Second Circuit in Pemex, comes into 
play when “the recognition or execution of the decision would be contrary 
to the public policy (“order public”) of that State [where recognition and 
execution is requested].”42  
The Second Circuit in Pemex followed the reasoning of another 
Second Circuit case, Ackermann v. Levine, in holding the Panama 
Convention rule to mean that “[a] judgment is unenforceable as against 
public policy to the extent that it is repugnant to fundamental notions of 
what is decent and just in the State where enforcement is sought.”43  
                                                   
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 105–07. 
39 Id. at 107. 
40 See Panama Convention, supra note 3, at art. 5(2)(b). 
41 Id. at art. 5(1)–5(2). 
42 Id. at art. 5(2)(b). 
43 See Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106 (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 
830, 831 (2d Cir. 1986)); see also Ackermann, 788 F.2d at 842 (noting that two 
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ii. Considerations for the Public Policy Exception 
The Pemex court considered “four powerful considerations” in 
analyzing whether the “high hurdle” of the public policy exception would 
apply.44 These were: “(1) the vindication of contractual undertakings and 
the waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of retroactive 
legislation that disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need to ensure 
legal claims find a forum; and (4) the prohibition against government 
expropriation without compensation.”45 
  
a. Waiver of Sovereign Immunity 
The Second Circuit noted that the waiver of sovereign immunity 
factor favored COMMISA, primarily since PEP had failed to raise the 
issue of immunity (specifically, immunity from having to arbitrate the 
rescission).46 PEP had knowingly entered into a contract that specifically 
limited COMMISA to arbitration in seeking remedy for a breach—thus, 
the immunity had been waived through the contract.47 The Second Circuit 
held that allowing PEP’s claim of immunity would run counter to contract 
law’s core idea: that parties’ expectations within the agreement (here, 
COMMISA’s expectation that arbitration was a valid option) should be 
enforced.48 
 
b. Retroactive Legislation 
According to the Second Circuit, the Mexican court’s retroactive 
application of Section 98 had an impermissible negative effect on the 
integrity of the contract.49 The Pemex court held “[r]etroactive legislation 
that cancels existing contract rights is repugnant to United States law . . . 
‘[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should 
                                                   
important considerations are the goal of comity, which drives the doctrine of 
respecting foreign judgements, and the necessity of fairness to litigants). 
44 See Pemex, 832 F.3d at 107. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 108 (“[c]ontract law . . . is designed to enforce parties’ 
contractual expectations” (quoting Hunt Constr. Grp. v. Brennan Beer 
Gorman/Architects, P.C., 607 F.3d 10, 14 (2nd Cir. 2010)). 
49 Id. 
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have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct 
accordingly.’”50 With the PEP-COMMISSA contract, it was 
“incontestable that the capacity of PEP to arbitrate was established in prior 
law; that it was withdrawn with respect to certain disputes that had already 
arisen; and that it was withdrawn in a way that frustrated contractual 
expectation.”51 
 
c. Forum Avaliability 
According to the Second Circuit, because COMMISA’s claims 
were now subject to a shorter statute of limitations, as well as the changes 
that Section 98 made to the arbitrability of administrative rescission 
claims, COMMISA was “twice the victim of unforeseen changes in the 
law.”52 Both of those changes resulted in COMMISA’s inability to have 
its claims heard if the arbitration award was not enforced—this runs 
entirely counter to the Second Circuit’s holding that “litigants with legal 
claims should have an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”53 
 
d. Illegal Government Takings 
 Finally, PEP rescinded the contracts and removed 
COMMISA from the project sites after the work was essentially finished, 
and then the Mexican government legislatively removed all of 
COMMISA’s routes to potential relief.54 These two facts deemed to mean 
that a “taking of private property without compensation for the benefit of 
the government” had occurred.55 While this would be clearly 
unconstitutional in the United States, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement also contains a provision that prohibits expropriation without 
payment of compensation.56 
 
E. Test as Articulated by Pemex 
The Pemex case addressed whether to recognize a foreign 
decision, namely the annulment of the arbitral award for COMMISA, 
through the prism of the Panama Convention. Specifically, the court 
                                                   
50 Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 110. 
53 Id. at 109–10. 
54 Id. at 110–11. 
55 Id. at 110. 
56 Id.   
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looked to Article 5 section 2(b) of the Panama Convention, which allows 
a court discretion in recognition or execution of a foreign decision when 
recognition would “offend the public policy of the state in which 
enforcement is sought.”57 
When making the decision, the court in Pemex started by stating 
the exception “does not swallow the rule” of a preference for “recognition 
and enforcement of foreign judgements.”58  The rule is a “standard [that] 
is high, and infrequently met,” and judgements are against public policy 
when they are “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and 
just.”59 Such judgements include those that move to clearly “undermine 
the public interest, the public confidence in the administration of the law, 
or [the] security for individual rights of personal liberty or of private 
property.”60 
The Second Circuit looked to “four powerful considerations” to 
test whether the district court’s refusal to confirm the award, in the face of 
the Mexican annulment, met this high standard and qualified for the public 
policy exception.61 
First, the court addressed whether or not there had been a 
contractual waiver of sovereign immunity.62 The court held that the 
arbitration agreement between the parties functioned to waive sovereign 
immunity for PEP, especially since PEP had only attempted to assert 
sovereign immunity in the “twelfth-hour.”63 
Second, the court considered the repugnance of retroactive 
application of laws to U.S. law.64 The Mexican court stated that it was not 
retroactively applying Section 98.65 However, the Second Circuit held that 
the fact that law empowered PEP to arbitrate and then revoked that power 
in regards to certain disputes with the passing of Section 98 removed any 
remedy for COMMISSA against PEP. The court held that this revocation 
was a retroactive application of the law.66 Adding to this, the court stated: 
                                                   
57 Id. at 105–06 (quoting Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d 
Cir. 1986)). 
58 Id. at 106.  
59 Id. at 107. 
60 Id. at 106. 
61 Id. at 107. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 107–08. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 108. 
66 Id. at 108–109. 
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“[t]hat PEP is part of the government that promulgated the law does not 
help at all.”67 
Third, the Second Circuit held that “COMMISA’s inability to 
have its breach of claims heard magnifies the injustice.”68 It stated, based 
on the idea of forum non conveniens: “litigants with legal claims should 
have an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”69 In Pemex, if 
COMMISA’s award was not confirmed, COMMISA would not have faced 
just a statute of limitations barrier but also res judicata issues in Mexican 
court.70 
Finally, the court considered whether or not there had been a 
government taking without compensation. Citing Tahoe-Sierra 
Presidential Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,71 the 
Second Circuit held that the state-owned PEP’s seizure of the project sites 
without compensation and the subsequent removal of relief by Mexican 
law combined to mean that there had been an unconstitutional taking under 
United States law.72 
 
II. THAI-LAO LIGNITE CO 
The year after the Pemex decision the Second Circuit, again, 
addressed the issue of the enforcement of annulled foreign arbitral awards 
in Thai-Lao Lignite.73 However, in the Thai-Lao Lignite case, the party 
petitioning the court did so with a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from 
judgement, meaning that there was more to consider than the bare 
international law concerns of the Panama Convention.74 But, there is 
                                                   
67 Id. at 109. 
68 Id. at 110. 
69 Id. at 109. 
70 Id. at 110.  
71 See id. at 110 (citing Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l 
Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321 (2002) ("When the government physically takes 
possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical 
duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is 
taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.")). 
72 Id. at 110–11. 
73 Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 177 (2nd Cir. 2017). 
74 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (“On motion and just terms, the court may 
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 
released, or discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has been reversed 
or vacated; or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable”) (emphasis added). 
See also Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, 
864 F.3d 172 (2d Cir. 2017). 
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significant overlap between Rule 60(b) considerations and the Panama 
Convention and New York Convention, with analysis for those 
conventions dovetailing nicely in to the Federal Rules requirements within 
the Second Circuit. 
 
A. Factual background 
As with the Pemex case, Thai-Lao Lignite Co. involved a dispute 
surrounding an allegedly wrongfully terminated business contract.75 In 
1994, Thai-Lao Lignite Co., LTD (“TLL”), a Thai corporation, and the 
Government of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (“Laos”) signed the 
contract in question.76 By agreement, TLL had done business conducting 
mining operations in Laos for several years prior.77  
The 1994 contract was a “Project Development Agreement” 
(“PDA”) that granted TLL the right to build and manage an electrical plant 
near the mining site.78 Under the agreement, TLL would secure its own 
funding for construction of the power plant.79 However, over the next 
twelve years, TLL failed to obtain funding, due in part to a regional 
financial downturn from 1997-2000.80 In 2006, Laos contacted TLL to 
express concern that the company would not fulfill its obligations under 
the PDA.81 TLL’s response did not satisfy Laos, and in October 2006, Laos 
notified TLL that Laos was terminating the PDA.82 TLL contended that 
the termination lacked appropriate procedure, and thus, Laos breached the 
PDA.83 
After failing to reach a settlement, the two parties initiated 
arbitration proceedings in 2007 in Malaysia, according to the forum 
selection clause in the PDA.84 The hearing was in mid-2009, and in 
November 2009, the arbitration panel issued an award for TLL.85 The 
panel ruled that TLL’s failure to raise required funding did not breach the 
PDA, but that Laos’s subsequent termination of the contract did constitute 
                                                   
75 Id. at 177. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 178. 
85 Id.  
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a breach.86 In total, the panel awarded a little over $5 million to TLL, 
including $40 million in investment costs, $4 million in lost opportunity 
costs, and interest and attorney’s fees.87 Malaysian law incorporates a 
limitation that an application to set aside an arbitrated award must be made 
within ninety days of the award’s issuance; Laos did not apply to set aside 
the award before the deadline in February 2010.88  
In June 2010, TLL began efforts to enforce the award by filing an 
action in New York state court that sought confirmation of the Malaysian 
panel’s judgment.89 Laos immediately removed the action to federal court, 
namely to the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York.90 In district court, Laos argued that the action be dismissed, asserting 
that the panel had wrongfully incorporated costs and had decided issues 
related to other contracts between the parties signed prior to the PDA.91 In 
August 2011, the district court ruled for TLL and enforced the arbitrated 
award, concluding that Laos’s objections “did not raise issues of 
jurisdiction or arbitrability,” and thus fell outside of the New York 
Convention’s grounds for non-enforcement.92 The court held further that 
even if Laos had raised either of these appropriate challenges, the court 
still would have enforced the award since “the parties agreed to delegate 
questions of arbitrability and jurisdiction to the panel.”93 Laos appealed 
the district court judgment to the Second Circuit, who affirmed the ruling 
below.94  
Concurrent with its efforts to obtain enforcement in the United 
States, TLL had also sought the same legal action in the UK and France.95 
                                                   
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. at 179. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. The New York Convention also allows for refusal to enforce an 
award if “[t]he award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling 
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on 
matters beyond the scope of the submission to arbitration, provided that, if the 
decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated from those not so 
submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted 
to arbitration may be recognized and enforced . . .” United Nations Convention 
on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art. V(c), June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517. 
93 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 179 (quoting Thai-Lao Lignite 
(Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of the Lao People's Democratic Republic, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 87844, at *45 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2011)). 
94 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 179. 
95 Id. 
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In 2010, TLL was successful in the High Court of Paris; however, a 
Parisian appeals court subsequently reversed that judgment, concluding 
the “Panel had improperly ruled on matters outside the scope of the 
arbitration agreement.”96 The High Court of Justice of England and Wales 
held for TLL and enforcement of the award in August 2011, as well.97  
Shortly after filing with the district court in New York, Laos had 
requested that that court stay the proceeding because Laos “had moved in 
Malaysia to set aside the award.”98 However, Laos’ counsel in Malaysia 
had not in fact filed the action in that country, so the district court 
proceeded with the action.99 However, the Malaysian High Court 
eventually accepted Laos’ application to set aside the award and at the 
same time granted an extension to the statute of limitations for filing such 
an application.100 
In December 2012, the Malaysian High Court “annulled the 
[a]ward, and ordered re-arbitration of the dispute before a new panel.”101 
The High Court held that while other courts (including in the U.S.) had 
already rejected Laos’ other challenges, the arbitration panel had indeed 
exceeded its jurisdiction and among other things had “impermissibly 
lumped together or co-mingled” the separate issues of the PDA and the 
prior contracts.102 The Malaysian Court of Appeal affirmed the High 
Court’s judgement in 2014.103 
 Two months after the initial annulment, in February 2013, Laos 
moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), (“Rule 60(b)”), to 
vacate the district court judgement in New York, citing the Malaysian 
annulment.104 This was more than a year and a half after the district court 
had originally entered judgment for TLL.105 TLL objected to the motion 
to vacate, arguing first that Laos should not have been granted an extension 
by the Malaysian court to file the set-aside action and, arguing second, that 
Laos’ illegal conduct was inequitable and should keep Laos from any Rule 
60(b) relief.106 
                                                   
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at 180 
102 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
103 Id. 
104 Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5). 
105 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 180. 
106 Id. 
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 The district court granted the Rule 60(b) motion in February 2014 
and vacated its previous judgement against Laos.107 In doing so, it held 
that it was required by the New York Convention to give effect to the 
Malaysian set-aside judgement, unless “giving effect to the judgment 
would violate our ‘fundamental notions of what is decent and just.’”108 The 
court weighed the alleged misconduct by Laos when applying this 
standard, but found that the issues did not “rise to the level of violating 
basic notions of justice such that [it] should ignore comity considerations 
and disregard the Malaysian judgments."109 TLL requested that the court 
require Laos to post security while an appeal to the order to vacate was 
pending—this was denied.110 
Further, the district court rejected TLL’s request to enforce the 
judgement from the English court, holding that “the later Malaysian 
judgment should have priority because Malaysia, as the seat of the 
arbitration and therefore the primary jurisdiction under the New York 
Convention, had the sole authority to determine whether the arbitral award 
was valid and, if not, to set it aside."111 TLL appealed the district court 
case to the Second Circuit.112 
 
B. Holding  
The Second Circuit affirmed the vacating order from the district 
court. The Circuit court concluded that the district court acted 
appropriately in not recognizing the English judgement and in not 
requiring Laos to post security pending appeal.113  
 
C. Reasoning 
In addressing the annulment of the Malaysian award, the Second 
Circuit looked first to Rule 60(b), which covers the grounds for relief from 
judgements available to litigants in federal courts.114 Next, it addressed 
Article 5 of the N.Y. Convention,115 which covers recognition and 
                                                   
107 Id. 
108 See id. at 180–81 (quoting Thai-Lao Lignite (Thai.) Co. v. Gov't of the Lao 
People's Democratic Republic, 997 F. Supp. 2d 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)). 
109 See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d at 223. 
110 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 181. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
114 Id.; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
115 See 21 UST 2517.  
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enforcement of awards from foreign arbitrations.116 Both of these 
emphasize a preference for respecting the previous judgement or award, 
and place a strong burden on the parties opposing the judgements. 
 
i. Rule 60(b) 
Rule 60(b) was not considered in the Pemex case, but addresses 
the federal standard for relief from rulings and reads in relevant part: 
 
(b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or 
Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may 
relieve a party or its legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: 
. . . .  
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has 
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is 
no longer equitable117 
 
The Second Circuit noted that the relief provided by this statute is 
to be “based on the particular circumstances of the case, taking into 
account the reason for any delay, the possible prejudice to the non-moving 
party, and the interests of finality.”118 Also, the relief falls into equity, so 
it is not available if the party requesting relief “is found to have acted 
inequitably.”119 as “final judgements should not be lightly reopened.”120 
 
ii. The New York Convention 
The New York Convention of 1958121 addressed recognition 
across borders of arbitrated awards, and was adopted by the members of 
the United Nations.122 Essentially identical to the later Panama 
Convention, the New York Convention, in its Article 5, lays out grounds 
                                                   
116 See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 181; see also 21 UST 2517 
art. V. 
117 Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). 
118 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 182 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. (quoting Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986)). 
121 See 21 UST 2517. 
122 Id. 
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for non-recognition of foreign judgements through seven exceptions to the 
general rule that such judgements should be enforced.123 Those exceptions, 
like the exceptions under the Panama Convention, cover situations where 
a party is unable to present their defense, where the arbitration procedures 
that were agreed upon or were laws of the forum jurisdiction were not 
followed, or, with relevance to the Thai-Lao Lignite case, where the award 
has been “set aside or suspended by a competent authority of the country 
in which, or under the law of which, that award was made.”124 The final 
exception under Article 5 section 2(b) is especially relevant: recognition 
and enforcement may be refused if “. . . (b) The recognition or enforcement 
of the award would be contrary to the public policy of [the country where 
recognition is sought].”125 
 The Second Circuit, in Thai-Lao Lignite, cited Pemex’s holding 
that “the prudential concern of international comity” governs the ultimate 
scope of a court’s discretion in choosing to enforce or to not enforce a 
judgement coming from a foreign jurisdiction under the New York 
Convention’s Article 5 exceptions.126 Pemex’s recognition of a “strong 
presumption in favor of following the primary jurisdiction’s ruling” was 
also adopted by the Second Circuit. 127 The analysis of the Thai-Lao 
Lignite court differed from the analysis in Pemex however, since there was 
no consideration of Rule 60(b) in that previous ruling.  
TLL argued before the Second Circuit that Rule 60(b)’s 
preference for both finality of judgements and deference to foreign 
decisions was not weighed heavily enough by the district court. This 
meant, according to TLL, that Laos had incorrectly lacked the burden to 
demonstrate their entitlement to 60(b) relief from the 2011 U.S. 
judgement.128 Laos’ opposing argument was that the New York 
Convention requires “giving conclusive effect to the Malaysian annulment 
of the [a]ward.”129 
Preliminarily, the Second Circuit found that Rule 60(b) applied to 
motions to vacate awards that are subsequently annulled.130 For this, it 
cited Article 3 of the New York Convention, which calls for enforcement 
of awards “in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where 
                                                   
123 21 UST 2517 art. V(1) (stating that “[r]ecognition and enforcement 
of the award may be refused . . . only if” the party against whom the judgement is 
invoked provides proof of seven exceptions). 
124 21 UST 2517 art. V(1)(e). 
125 21 UST 2517 art. V(2)(b). 
126 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 183–84. 
127 Id. at 184. 
128 Id. at 184–85. 
129 Id. at 185. 
130 Id. 
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the award is relied upon.”131 The court held that “[i]n our view, Rule 60(b) 
is one such ‘rule of procedure.’"132  
 
iii. “the full range of considerations” 
The Second Circuit held that Rule 60(b) motions, based on later-
annulled arbitral awards, are not governed entirely by the New York 
Convention’s “concern for comity.”133 Rather, “the full range of Rule 
60(b) considerations, including the weighty interests served by protecting 
the finality of judgments of our courts” must be considered.134 Further, 
courts “must be attentive to the fact that the burden of demonstrating the 
vacatur is appropriate lies with the party seeking that result.”135 This 
burden “need not be an onerous” one though, “and it need not require too 
much more from the district court than was done here,” but it “does require 
recognition and consideration of the interests protected by Rule 60(b).”136 
Applying this to the Thai-Lao Lignite facts, the Second Circuit 
“presume[d] that the district court, in its diligence, considered the Rule 
60(b) factors,” even while noting that a more explicit consideration by the 
lower court “would have been helpful.”137 The Second Circuit based its 
presumption on a number of observations of the district court’s 
reasoning.138  
First, it noted that the district court “gave some explicit 
consideration to the interests of justice” in noting that the Malaysian 
annulment “did not leave [TLL] . . . without a remedy,” and noting that 
the dispute would be re-arbitrated.139 This contrasted with Pemex, where a 
particular combination of changed laws, statute of limitation issues, and 
an annulment came together to “preclude[e] any future recovery.”140 
Next, the Second Circuit looked at the district court’s recognition 
of what the appellate court called “far less suspect” circumstances in the 
Malaysian proceedings contrasted with the circumstances around the 
                                                   
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 185. 
133 Id. at 186–87. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 187. 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 187. 
139 Id. 
140 Id. 
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proceedings in Pemex.141 These “less suspect” circumstances meant that 
the annulment ruling was “more worthy of presumptive recognition.”142 
While not explicitly spelled out in Thai-Lao Lignite, the concerning 
circumstances in Pemex that the court refers to seem likely to be the 
changes in Mexican laws that happened to benefit a government-owned 
entity in a potentially very expensive arbitration.143 In Pemex, the Second 
Circuit had used the “four powerful considerations” of public policy: 
waiver of sovereign immunity, repugnancy of retroactive legislation, the 
need to find a forum, and a concern for illegal government takings.144 In 
Thai-Lao Lignite however, the court held that while “we might not 
necessarily agree with the merits of the Malaysian courts' judgments, we 
see no grounds for such concerns.”145 
 
a. Inequitable Conduct 
The Second Circuit continued its analysis by concluding that the 
“inequitable conduct” that TLL asserted Laos engaged in did not “justif[y] 
denying Laos the relief from enforcement that it requests.”146 It found that 
the allegedly inequitable conduct was “largely, the merits of legal 
positions taken, and not egregious behavior of another sort,” and had 
already been properly addressed and given no weight by the district court 
below prior to the appeal.147  
Some of the principal conduct that TLL complained about 
involved Laos’ failure to comply in timely fashion with discovery orders 
from the district court—this was also considered by the court below which 
declined at the time to issue sanctions upon TLL’s request.148 The Second 
Circuit held that if the district court had considered the conduct “in the 
                                                   
141 Id. 
142 Id. 
143 See Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. 
De C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 110 (2nd Cir., 2016) 
(“PEP, acting on behalf of the Mexican government, rescinded the contracts and 
forcibly removed COMMISA from the project sites. Then, by legislation, Mexico 
frustrated relief that had been granted to COMMISA in the arbitral forum and 
consigned it to a forum in which relief was foreclosed both by the statute of 
limitations and res judicata. . . . the enforcement of [the new] Mexican law 
amounted to a taking of private property without compensation for the benefit of 
the government.”). 
144 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 187. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. at 188. 
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context of Laos’s Rule 60(b)(5) motion,” the lower court would still not 
have found the issue so egregious as to be enough to “justify its continued 
enforcement of an annulled award.”149 It seemed to agree with Laos’ 
argument that if the district court would have held that the conduct was 
enough to prevent vacatur of the annulment, Laos would have been on the 
hook for a $57 million judgement that would have essentially been 
equivalent to a discovery sanction, an impliedly unnecessarily “steep fine 
indeed.”150 
Other conduct by Laos that TLL complained about “is best 
described as either unnecessarily combative or careless,” and the Second 
Circuit was “not persuaded that it demonstrate[d] the kind of ‘chutzpah’ 
that has led courts in this Circuit to deny otherwise merited relief, or that 
the [d]istrict [c]ourt . . . would have seen as outcome-determinative.”151 To 
support this, the Second Circuit contrasted Laos’ behavior with the 
behavior in one of the Circuit’s previous cases, Uzan, where Rule 60(b) 
relief had been denied because the moving party had “not pursued their 
defense with clean hands[,] . . . time and again . . . rais[ing] legal 
roadblocks to the enforcement of the judgment against them . . . and 
persistently endeavor[ing] to evade the lawful jurisdiction of the [d]istrict 
[c]ourt and undermine its careful and determined work.”152 Laos’ 
behavior, according to the court, fell far short of the “persistent disrespect 
and noncompliance for which we and the district court criticized the 
unsuccessful movants in Uzan.”153 
 
b. Interest in Finality 
Last, the Second Circuit considered the “interest in finality,” 
which protects harm to the previously prevailing party from “repeated and 
otherwise unfounded challenges to its judgments.”154 It rejected Laos’ 
contention that the timing of a motion to vacate is “irrelevant,” saying that 
“[h]ad ten years elapsed before the set-aside proceedings were concluded,” 
plus “more time elapsed before Laos moved to vacate the [a]ward,” 
finality interests may have overcome the “deference to the primary 
                                                   
149 Id. at 188. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 Id. (citing Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 127–28 
(2009)). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
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jurisdiction presumptively called for by the New York Convention.”155 
However, the court found that the district court acted properly in vacating 
the prior judgement due to the Malaysian annulment, in part because TLL 
knew that annulment proceedings were ongoing even while TLL was 
seeking to have their award enforced in the district court.156 Also, Laos 
had “sought relief promptly” once the Malaysian court annulled the 
arbitral award.157 
 
c. TLL’s Request for Posting of Security 
The district court did not require Laos to post security for the 
amount of the contested award for two reasons.158 First, “requiring Laos, 
a foreign sovereign, to post security would be tantamount to attachment of 
Laos’ assets,” violating the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FISA).159 
Second, the lower court remarked that even without a FISA bar, it would 
still not require the security based on its discretion.160 The Second Circuit 
affirmed the district court simply saying that the lower court would have 
been within its discretion either way; and thus, the question of whether or 
not FISA would bar the security request did not need to be addressed.161 
 
d. Enforcement of the English Judgment 
Finally, the Second Circuit rejected TLL’s argument that the 
judgment previously secured in England against Laos should be enforced 
based on the New York Uniform Foreign Country Money-Judgements 
Recognition Act.162 Under that provision, TLL had filed for enforcement 
and the clerk of court had issued a notice of default against Laos in the 
Southern District of New York after Laos had failed to initially appear.163 
                                                   
155 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 189. 
156 Id. 
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012) (“The property in the 
United States of a foreign state . . . used for a commercial activity in the United 
States, shall not be immune from attachment in aid of execution, or from 
execution, upon a judgment entered by a court of the United States or of a State 
after the effective date of this Act, if. . . . (1) the foreign state has waived its 
immunity from attachment in aid of execution or from execution either explicitly 
or by implication . . . .”). 
160 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 189. 
161 Id. at 190. 
162 Id. at 190; see also N.Y. CPLR §§ 5301–09. 
163 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 190. 
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Laos subsequently appeared before the default judgement was entered and 
moved to vacate the default, in response to which the district court placed 
the burden on TLL to show cause as to why the English judgement should 
not be denied enforcement.164 After hearing TLL’s response the district 
court denied enforcement of the judgement, based on leeway within the 
New York statue for “conflicts with [other] final and conclusive 
judgment[s]” and equitable considerations, and then, closed the case.165 
The Second Circuit agreed in a straightforward manner with the district 
court’s reasoning and affirmed the order denying the petition to enforce 
the judgement.166 
 
D. Test as Articulated in Thai-Lao 
Unlike Pemex, where recognition of a foreign decision was 
viewed through the lens of the Panama Convention only, the court in Thai-
Lao was forced to address FRCP Rule 60(b) in addition to an international 
treaty. The Second Circuit overlaid the Rule 60(b) elements onto the New 
York Convention considerations, coming up with a test that satisfied both 
the FRCP and the Convention.167 This test looked at the reasonableness of 
the time period between the initial judgement and the motion to vacate, the 
equitable conduct of the party moving to vacate, and a balance between 
concerns for justice and finality and the concern for international 
comity.168 
The timing of Laos’ motion to vacate was held not to be 
unreasonable so that it outweighed the deference to the primary 
jurisdiction, Malaysia.169 This timing is a part of the interest in finality 
specifically, “which protects the prevailing party’s (and the courts’) 
tangible interest in avoiding the costs, uncertainty, and even disrespect 
reflected by repeated and otherwise unfounded challenges to its 
judgments.”170 The court stated that ten years of set-aside proceedings plus 
additional time for Laos to move to vacate “might well outweigh the 
deference” but did not hold that the current case’s timeline (three years 
from the arbitrated award to the conclusion of the Malaysian set-aside 
action and then two months from the annulment to the motion to vacate) 
                                                   
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 186. 
168 Id. 
169 Id. at 188–89. 
170 Id. at 188. 
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combined with the prompt seeking of relief by Laos was enough to keep 
Laos from relief.171  
Laos’ “inequitable conduct” was not enough to bar relief either, 
since it involved “the merits of legal positions taken, and not egregious 
behavior of another sort.”172 The court did not detail what this “behavior 
of another sort” might be, but went on to quote the district court that Laos’ 
conduct regarding discovery orders “did not ‘evince[] bad faith or serious 
and studied disregard for the orderly process of justice,’ as would be 
required to warrant a sanctions award,” and that Laos had taken 
“reasonable (if ultimately mistaken) legal position[s].”173 The Second 
Circuit noted that this district court analysis of Laos’ conduct had not been 
in the context of Rule 60(b) but held that it would nonetheless generate 
same ultimate result if the lower court had been considering Rule 60(b).174 
Further, other conduct by Laos was “unnecessarily combative or careless,” 
not reaching the level of the unclean hands and “persistent disrespect and 
noncompliance” of the movant denied in Uzan.175 
The Second Circuit looked to the interests of justice, noting that 
there was, unlike in Pemex, a route to a remedy for TLL (through re-
arbitration).176 In the context of the interests of justice, the court 
acknowledged the “four powerful considerations” articulated in Pemex, 
but found that they were unnecessary in Thai-Lao since the Malaysian 
proceedings were “far less suspect and therefore more worthy of 
presumptive recognition.”177  
Combining this lack of “suspect” proceedings with a reasonable 
timetable for Laos’ motion, the Second Circuit declined to hold that the 
concern for international comity was outweighed.178 
 
III. COMBINING THE TESTS 
Pemex and Thai-Lao provided a test applicable at least within the 
Second Circuit that can be synthesized. For situations where an arbitral 
award is annulled in its jurisdiction of origin, Pemex focused on an 
international treaty, and Thai-Lao expanded the treaty analysis to include 
                                                   
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 187. 
173 Id. at 188 (quoting Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110353 at *5 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)). 
174 Id. 
175 Id.; see also Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123 (2nd Cir. 
2009). 
176 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 187. 
177 Id. 
178 Id. at 187–189. 
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a number of factors connected to Rule 60(b).179 The combined test looks 
to a balance of justice and comity, specifically at “four powerful 
considerations,” and then gives consideration to an interest in the finality 
of judgements/timeliness of relief and to the equitable conduct of the party 
seeking relief. 
Whether a court chooses to apply the Panama Convention or the 
New York Convention, “[t]here is no substantive difference between the 
two: both evince a ‘pro-enforcement bias.’”180 Under both conventions, 
this enforcement is to be effected according to the laws of the state where 
enforcement is sought.181 This bias comes from a concern for 
“international comity,”182 with the goal of promoting “cooperation and 
reciprocity” and stands despite all but some of the most substantial 
challenges.183 Overriding this presumption in favor of the primary 
                                                   
179 Id. at 186 (“[I]n ruling on a Rule 60(b)(5) motion, even in the context 
of a judgment entered on a foreign arbitral award under the New York 
Convention, a district court should be guided by the full range of interests 
protected by Rule 60(b). Courts should consider whether the motion was made 
within a reasonable time, whether the movant acted equitably, and whether 
vacatur would strike an appropriate balance between serving the ends of justice 
and preserving the finality of judgments, as well as the prudential concern for 
international comity.”). 
180 Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. De 
C.V. v. Pemex-Exploración Y Producción, 832 F.3d 92, 105 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. 
dismissed, 137 S. Ct. 1622, 197 L. Ed. 2d 746 (2017). 
181 Article III of the New York Convention places on each contracting 
state the obligation to “recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in 
accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied 
upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles.” Thai-Lao Lignite 
Co., 864 F.3d at 183; see also Panama Convention, 14 I.L.M. 336 art. 4 (“[An 
arbitral award’s] execution or recognition may be ordered in the same manner as 
that of decisions handed down by national or foreign ordinary courts, in 
accordance with the procedural laws of the country where it is to be executed and 
the provisions of international treaties.”). 
182 Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106 (“Although courts in this country have long 
recognized the principles of international comity and have advocated them in 
order to promote cooperation and reciprocity with foreign lands, comity remains 
a rule of ‘practice, convenience, and expediency,’ rather than of law.” (quoting 
Pravin Banker Assocs., Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d 
Cir. 1997))). 
183 See Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 186 (“[U]nder the Convention, 
the power and authority of the local courts of the [primary jurisdiction] remain of 
paramount importance.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Yusuf 
Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys “R” Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 22 (2nd Cir. 1997))). 
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jurisdiction must, under either convention’s Article 5, involve an appeal 
to “fundamental notions of what is decent and just” and be against the 
public policy of the United States.184  
Pemex balanced justice and comity with “four powerful 
considerations,” which test whether recognizing and enforcing a foreign 
award would run afoul of that public policy.185 These four considerations 
are: “(1) the vindication of contractual undertakings and the waiver of 
sovereign immunity; (2) the repugnancy of retroactive legislation that 
disrupts contractual expectations; (3) the need to ensure legal claims find 
a forum; and (4) the prohibition against government expropriation without 
compensation.”186 
In the United States, valid contractual waivers of sovereign 
immunity must be enforced.187 Contract law “is designed to enforce 
parties’ contractual expectations,”188 and parties cannot, as in Pemex, 
validly contract for arbitration but then subsequently invoke sovereign 
immunity.189 A judgement that allows a party to invoke sovereign 
immunity in that situation would be against the public policy of the United 
States.190 
                                                   
“The annulment of an arbitral award in the primary jurisdiction should therefore 
be given significant weight.” Id. 
184 Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106. Enforcement of the [foreign] judgement must 
“offend the public policy” of the United States, which would mean the judgement 
is “repugnant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just.” Id. Another 
federal circuit, the Fifth, has held that limiting a seaman’s choice-of-law by 
contract in an arbitration clause is not enough to meet the high standard of the 
public policy exception in the New York Convention. See Asignacion v. Rickmers 
Genoa Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbH & Cie KG, 783 F.3d 1010, 1018–20 (5th Cir. 
2015) (“[W]e should be reluctant to conclude that lesser remedies make an award 
unenforceable on policy grounds . . . . [T]he district court only determined that 
the arbitration and award “effective[ly] deni[ed]” Asignacion the right to pursue 
his general maritime remedies. But that finding is insufficient to support the 
conclusion that the public policy of the United States requires refusing to enforce 
the award.”) (emphasis added). 
185 Pemex, 832 F.3d at 106. 
186 Id. at 107. 
187 Id.; see also C&L Enters., Inc. v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian 
Tribe of Okla., 532 U.S. 411, 418–23 (2001) (“[T]he Tribe clearly consented to 
arbitration and to the enforcement of arbitral awards . . . the Tribe thereby waived 
its sovereign immunity from . . . suit.”). 
188 Hunt Constr. Grp., Inc. v. Brennan Beer Gorman/Architects, P.C., 607 
F.3d 10, 14 (2d Cir. 2010). 
189 See Pemex, 832 F.3d at 108. 
190 Id. 
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The Pemex court held that “[r]etroactive legislation that cancels 
existing contract rights is repugnant to United States law [because] 
‘[e]lementary considerations of fairness dictate that individuals should 
have an opportunity to know what the law is and to conform their conduct 
accordingly.’”191 It is against public policy to penalize a party who 
contracts under a law simply because that law is retroactively changed.192 
The Second Circuit held that “litigants with legal claims should 
have an opportunity to bring those claims somewhere.”193 A statute of 
limitations bar enacted retroactively, so that a party effectively never has 
an opportunity to bring a claim, might be enough to trigger this 
consideration that legal claims must find a forum.194 However, certainly if 
a party must contend with statute of limitations issues plus more barriers, 
an “injustice” results.195 In Pemex, one such additional issue creating 
equitable concerns was res judicata—the Mexican court’s ruling applying 
new laws retroactively silenced any future relief in court for the party 
seeking to have the award upheld, and “[s]uch a result offends basic 
domestic principles of claim preclusion.”196 
It is against public policy for a judgment to constitute the “taking 
of private property without compensation for the benefit of the 
government.”197 The court in Pemex also noted that the North American 
Free Trade Agreement likewise contains a provision that prohibits 
                                                   
191 Id. (quoting Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 265 (1994)). 
192 Id. 
193 Id. at 109. “The general rule of mootness is relaxed for issues that are 
‘capable of repetition, yet evading review’ because otherwise parties would be 
left ‘without a chance of redress.’” Id. (quoting S. Pac. Terminal Co. v. Interstate 
Com. Comm'n, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911)). 
194 Id. at 110. 
195 Id. 
196 Id. (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) (“Under res 
judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their 
privies from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that 
action.”) (emphasis added by the court to the quotation)). 
197 Id. at 110. See also Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l 
Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002) (“When the government physically takes 
possession of an interest in property for some public purpose, it has a categorical 
duty to compensate the former owner, regardless of whether the interest that is 
taken constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.”); see also TermoRio 
S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 928, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“The test of 
public policy cannot be simply whether the courts of a secondary State would set 
aside an arbitration award if the award had been made and enforcement had been 
sought within its jurisdiction.”). 
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expropriation without payment of compensation.198 Enforcement of an 
arbitral award that would amount to an illegal government taking in the 
United States would obviously be against the public policy of the United 
States.199 
Thai-Lao saw these four considerations as one part of the test 
when looking at a Rule 60(b) motion as well, since they provided insight 
as to whether or not recognition of the foreign award would be contrary to 
the “ends of justice”.200 However, these four factors do not need to be 
considered in every case.201 In Thai-Lao, the court stated, “we see no 
grounds for such concerns,” referring to these four factors, after looking at 
the circumstances in the Malaysian proceedings.202 Impliedly, 
circumstances that would necessitate the four-factor test of public policy 
violation (and thus potentially impact the ends of justice) would be those 
like in Pemex, where a government-owned party benefits from changed 
laws and circumvents basic tenets of contract law (deference to party 
choice).203 
The second factor for considering Rule 60(b) motions from Thai-
Lao is an interest in the finality of judgments.204 Essentially, this factor 
looks to whether the original judgment (in Thai-Lao, the original 
enforcement award) has been around for so long that it is “locked in” and 
should not be changed. This interest in finality might be overcome by 
                                                   
198 Pemex, 832 F.3d at 110. 
199 Id. at 111 (holding that the Mexican judgement annulling the arbitral 
award and amounting to an illegal taking “would undermine public confidence in 
laws and diminish rights of personal liberty and property.”) (emphasis added). 
200 Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 184 (2d Cir. 2017). 
201 Id. at 187. 
202 See id. (holding that the Malaysian proceedings were “far less 
suspect” than the proceedings in Mexico in Pemex). 
203 See id. See also TermoRio S.A. E.S.P. v. Electranta S.P., 487 F.3d 
928, 940 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“Because there is nothing in the record here indicating 
that the proceedings before the Consejo de Estado were tainted or that the 
judgment of that court is other than authentic, the District Court was, as it held, 
obliged to respect it.”); see also Getma Int'l v. Republic of Guinea, 862 F.3d 45, 
50 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“there is scant evidence of taint in the [foreign] proceedings, 
and we see no infirmities that prejudiced Getma in a manner so offensive to “basic 
notions of morality and justice” as to justify disregarding the [foreign] decision.”). 
204 “Properly applied Rule 60(b) strikes a balance between serving the 
ends of justice and preserving the finality of judgments.” Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 
F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1986). The interest in finality can be described as “ensuring 
that litigation reaches an end within a finite period of time.” See House v. 
Secretary of Health & Human Services, 688 F.2d 7, 9 (1982). 
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“extraordinary circumstances” like those of Pemex.205 The timing of the 
motion comes into play as well—Thai-Lao holds that ten years of set-aside 
proceedings between the original foreign judgment and the annulment plus 
more for the Rule 60(b) motion process “might” be enough to overcome 
the interest in finality.206 A shorter time, like the three years in Thai-Lao, 
is likely not enough for a court following the Second Circuit test to find 
that the interest in the finality of such a relatively recent judgment is so 
strong that the judgment cannot be overturned.207 
Finally, the equitable conduct of the party seeking non-
recognition of the foreign judgment must also be assessed. Here, “unclean 
hands” can be enough to deny relief via Rule 60(b), as in Motorola Credit 
Corporation v. Uzan, where the party requesting relief had “persistently 
endeavored to evade the lawful jurisdiction of the [d]istrict [c]ourt.”208 The 
conduct in that case was described as “persistent disrespect and 
noncompliance” by the Second Circuit in Thai-Lao, and was an example 
of the kind of conduct that would prevent a party from Rule 60(b) relief.209 
There is at least some consideration of the amount of the judgment in 
connection with whatever this conduct might be. In Thai-Lao, some of the 
alleged “inequitable conduct” was related to discovery.210 The court there 
found that enforcing the foreign judgment based only on relatively 
innocuous discovery-related actions by the party seeking non-recognition 
of the judgment would essentially result in a massive discovery 
sanction.211 This, the court implied, would not be in keeping with the 
interests of justice.212 
 
                                                   
205See also In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001 (Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia), 741 F.3d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the interest in 
finality was overcome with “extraordinary circumstances”). 
206 Thai-Lao Lignite Co. v. Gov’t of the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, 864 F.3d 172, 189 (2d Cir. 2017). 
207But see Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 741 F.3d at 357 (“Whenever the 
law changes, parties who lost a prior case because of the now-altered law may 
feel that justice was not done. Generally, the interest in finality outweighs that 
concern.”). 
208 Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 561 F.3d 123, 128 n.5 (2d Cir. 2009). 
209 Thai-Lao Lignite Co., 864 F.3d at 188. 
210 See id. at 187–88. 
211 Id. at 188. 
212 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
 The Second Circuit’s addressing of this narrow issue in 
these two cases provides at least some direction for parties seeking 
enforcement of foreign judgments regarding arbitral awards in the United 
States. However, between Pemex and Thai-Lao there is still plenty of room 
for subsequent cases with distinguishable facts.  
The “truly unusual” (read: egregious) facts in Pemex meant that 
all “four powerful considerations” readily favored non-enforcement of the 
foreign judgment. But what happens when, for example, legislation is 
actively applied retroactively (one factor) but there is none of the 
governmental expropriation (another factor) found in Pemex? Similarly, 
the Thai-Lao court’s assertion that ten years “might” be enough to lock in 
a previous judgment, and thus induce a court to decline to enforce a 
subsequent set-aside, leaves a continuing question. Consider a 
hypothetical future case with an initial judgment enforced in the Second 
Circuit, say, nine years before the set-aside judgment in the foreign 
jurisdiction is rendered. How many of the other factors (the four powerful 
considerations as well as equitable concerns) would have to weigh in favor 
of non-enforcement for the court to say “nine years seems like too much 
time, since the finality of judgments is important and combining this with 
the other factors we hold that the subsequent judgment should not be 
enforced”? 
This then must be the main takeaway from these two cases; the 
factors articulated in Pemex and Thai-Lao are just that: factors. Pemex 
gave an example of when almost all the factors favored non-enforcement 
of the foreign arbitral judgment, and Thai-Lao, while providing some 
contrasting guidance in dicta, gave an example of when almost all the 
factors favored enforcement of the foreign judgment. Therefore, while the 
test for whether foreign arbitral set-aside judgments should be enforced in 
the Second Circuit is now relatively clear, future precedent is necessary to 
better predict how varying facts will be analyzed using the test. 
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